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Understanding «Understanding»
Industrial Relations Research and Policy
in Canada from 1969 to 1984 ... and Beyond
H. W. Arthurs

This paper is the H.D. Woods Memorial Lecture presented at
the 1984 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Industrial Relations
Association, Guelph, Ontario.
Canadian Industrial Relations, the report of the Woods Task Force on
Labour Relations, appeared in 1969 1• At the time, and for some years
thereafter, many of us who were in some way associated with the Task
Force nurtured two hopes. First, we believed that the Report itself would
usher in a new era in labour-management relations, and second, we believed
that it signalled the coming of age of industrial relations as a scholarly
discipline or, rather, as the quintessential interdiscipline, each part of which
could only be understood in relation to the others. Woods himself shared
these hopes. As he said in the letter which transmitted the Report to the
Prime Minister .
. . . we would hope that this Report and the studies ... will generate a greater
understanding of the problems and issues in the field of industrial relations in
Canada; and that they will stimulate further research in this important area.

Now, fifteen years later, as the Macdonald Commission finds itself in
the midst of a similar - albeit more extensive - enterprise, some reconsideration of both themes may be timely. How far have we managed to progress towards the benign regime of understanding sought by Woods and his
colleagues, and towards the new age of intellectual enquiry he, and they and we - would have wished for?
I cannot personally place on the record either eye-witness testimony or
scientific evidence to support my conclusions; my own involvement in the
field as a practitioner and as a scholar has been only intermittent over the
past ten or fifteen years. But I do have my suspicions and perhaps if I voice
them, they will at least stimulate those who are closer to the facts to rise and
bear witness.
First, to the extent that the behaviour of labour and management, the
public and government reflect the present state of «understanding», one
could hardly be positive about the record of Canada's collective bargaining
system since 1969. At various times during this period, we have seen ex•
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treme manifestations of militancy and intransigence by both sides rather
than the growth of maturity; increased state intervention rather than
enhanced self-government in industry; waning public tolerance for the costs
of industrial conflict rather than greater willingness to accept such costs as
the price of free collective bargaining; compounding complexity and
legalism rather than common-sense attempts to resolve problems pragmatically. In short, the very premises of the «understanding» contemplated by
the Task Force have been put in question.
To turn to Woods' hope that research would be stimulated, here again
rather the contrary seems to have occurred. At least in my own field of
labour relations law, but perhaps in other areas of industrial relations
research, development seems to have been at best modest. The perplexing
problems of labour-management relations have not, apparently, engaged
the attention of our most innovative scholars, nor does a sturdy yeomanry
of researchers seem to have consistently produced a bountiful harvest of
books and articles. This assessment of research is, however, both tentative
and preliminary - «tentative» because it is subject to revision by a proper
assessment of the state of the art which is just now getting under way,
«preliminary» because I will elaborate upon what I have said later in my
remarks.
But, in general and subject to these lawyer-like attempts to hedge my
bets, my impression is that neither in terms of enhanced understanding nor
in terms of intensified research activity have the hopes of the Task Force,
and of the Task Force generation of scholars, been realized. The question I
want to pursue is «why?»? What I want to do is to understand «understanding», using that term to encompass both its meanings - «understanding»
in the sense of tolerance and the appreciation of mutual interdependence
which is of the essence of a system of collective bargaining, and «understanding» in the sense of an informed and critical attitude which is of the
essence of research.
Let me begin with «understanding» in the industrial relations sense.
The promotion of «understanding» is obviously a matter about which the
Macdonald Commission has been, and will be, concerned. Its mandate encompasses a number of industrial relations themes, its ambitious research
programme includes many labour-related studies, and its recommendations
cannot fail to include proposals designed to improve the state of
«understanding» in the world of work. How, indeed, could any grand
design to enhance Canada's social and economic well-being fail to do so?
Yet, at the same time, we must ask how it is that the Task Force Report
which addressed these very issues failed to accomplish its objectives?
The answer is, in part, that the Task Force failed to foresee the advent
of a new economic ice age, the retreat of prosperity and the chilling of optimism in the 1970s. Standing at the watershed of 1969, it was easy enough
to look back twenty or thirty years, at Canada's recovery from the Great
Depression, at the growth and diversification of industry and industrial
employment, at the contentious beginnings - but apparently permanent
establishment - of collective bargaining as primary public policy, at the
emergence of the labour movement as a social and political presence as well
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as an effective economic instrument for its members - in short, at the apparent normalization of relations between the collective bargaining partners.
This is not to claim that labour-management relations in the late 1960s
were then perceived as idyllic, as incapable of further evolution or improvement. Of course they were not: that is why the Task Force was appointed.
But the questions raised about collective bargaining then were relatively
modest concerns. Collective bargaining itself was a «given»; its present
legitimacy and future survival were not seriously questioned. Rather, the
Task Force itself stated that its objective was «to examine the relationship
between collective bargaining and many of Canada's other socio-economicpolitical goals, policies and instruments» with a view to «reconciling» all of
these. (135) It concluded its examination, and commenced its recommendations, with the general observation that
We continue to endorse the present industrial relations system in Canada not
only because of its virtues ... but because we see no alternative that is compatible with the heritage of western values and institutions ... (427)

I have described this view as one which looks backward at Canada's
postwar experience rather than forward to the 1970s and 1980s. If we could
have looked forward, what would we have seen?
With only a little prescience, I imagine, we might have addressed the
difficulties implied by changing demographic and labour force trends: an
entire generation of young people entering the labour force through the
1970s, many more of them women than before, confronting social obligations and financial debts of daunting proportions, but unable to anticipate
normal patterns of progression from school to work to retirement
Their plight, I suggest, we might have foreseen had we been able to
recognize the signs and portents. But who in 1969 could have anticipated
that someone would have cried havoc and unleashed the dogs of war,
galloping oil prices, inflation, monetarism, unemployment and protectionism? Who could have imagined that in the 1970s and 1980s the pace of
capital concentration would quicken in Canada, or that the multinationals
would rapidly redeploy their manufacturing operations into selected third
world countries? Who could have predicted the rise and fall of Alberta's oil
patch, British Columbia's forest products, Ontario's secondary manufacturing sector, and the Atlantic fisheries - with the awful strains that these
events imposed upon our political and economic union?
Even if the mandate of the Woods Task Force had been as broad as
that of the Macdonald Commission, even if it had more thoroughly explored the socio-political-economic context of our industrial relations
system, it could never have begun to plan for these events which, in 1969,
lay just over the horizon. But foreseeable or not, these and other largelooming events of the past fifteen years have created - to borrow a phrase - «a
new reality» in which all of our assumptions - including the survival of collective bargaining as we hnow it - are being called into question.
Let me try to describe that new reality as it might appear from the
perspective of a hypothetical Task Force assessing the industrial relations
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system in 1984 or, let us say, of the Macdonald Commission, as it diagnoses
and prescribes for the industrial ills of our time.
To begin with the brutal truth: there is no basic <<Understanding»;
labour is locked out. It is not an effective participant in the political life of
the country, plays a social role but fitfully and with limited impact, and exercises adventitious economic power here and there, now and then, but
without well-defined purposes or predictable outcomes. «Labour», indeed,
lacks even the dignity of definition. It is not a movement, but at best several
loose coalitions of largely decentralized unions; it is not a class, but at best a
range of occupations which imply no necessary commonality of economic
circumstance or interest, cultural or social values; it is not even a predictable
condition of life, but (as so many Canadians now know) at best an aspiration to get a job or hold onto one.
The fundamental issue of industrial policy confronting the Macdonald
Commission is whether it wants to recognize this new - and brutal - reality and what it proposes to do to revise it.
As to recognition of labour's plight, the Commission has been, and will
doubtless again be, reminded that conditions of life for most Canadians,
even now, are amongst the most favourable in the world. The Commission
will be, and has been, urged (perhaps even by «labour» spokesmen) to improve, but not fundamentally to alter, the existing industrial arrangements
which have brought us relative affluence and considerable freedom. But
while this will be the general tenor of some submissions, the Commission will
also hear many emotionally-charged arguments designed to gain its sympathy or bring down its wrath upon real and supposed abuse in the labour
sector.
Forty years after collective bargaining was embraced as a basic policy
in Canada, it will be said, many employers remain intransigently opposed to
it; some governements will casually trade it away for almost any «greater
good»; and the public generally is out of sympathy with its practise and
perceived results. On the other hand, it will be said that Canadian workers
are more strike-prone and less efficient than those of our major international competitors, and that unionization has overburdened the financial
resources of public and private employers alike. Econometric analysis will
purport to reveal that minimum wages injure the job prospects of women,
minority groups and young people. Ethical philosophers, theologians and
close observers of poverty will remind us of our moral duty to the working
and non-working poor.
But whatever the intrinsic force of these particular arguments, few of
them will help the Commission gain an overall perspective on «labour» and
its role in the Canadian economic union. This it cannot do without confronting three issues which, indeed, reappear in almost every area of its mandate.
First, there is the issue of strinking a new balance between reliance
upon unregulated market mechanisms and extensive planning and interventionism. Labour policy has indeed become more interventionist in recent
years: witness the AIB, «6 and 5», the conscious decisions to create
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unemployment, reduce inflation and - recently - to sacrifice trade union
power to propitiate the gods of investment. But there is no evidence that intervention is planned extensively - or at all. On the contrary, improvisation seems to be the order of the day, and little ongoing effort is made to involve labour (or anyone else) in the development and implementation of
long-term public strategies or counterpart activities at the sectoral or corporate level.
Macdonald will neither lay the ghost of Adam Smith, nor commune
with Karl Marx. But decisions to alter the mix of spontaneous action and
planning, and of private and public decision-making, will affect the labour
sector: manpower training and deployment, unemployment insurance and
strike statistics are all implicated in this basic issue.
A second issue, made inescapable by the mandate of the Commission,
is the difficulty of divorcing economics from the rest of life. The tremors of
the labour market, for example, signal possible deep rifts in the social
fabric: family life and mental health, educational and cultural attainments,
attitudes towards minority groups may all be significantly determined by
plant closings, structural unemployment and other consequences of hardnosed economic policy-making. Decisions to repress labour strife by legal
sanctions, in order to improve overall industrial performance, may trespass
on fundamental, constitutional rights of equality, association or communication. Even benign social measures, such as the introduction of
«equal pay for equal work», which may or may not have macro-economic
significance, may produce unexpected consequences as their costs are
sought to be offset within the firm or displaced elsewhere. All of this is trite,
but these examples underline for the Commission the need for holistic treatment in its deliberations, rather than for the mere aggregation of specialist
diagnoses and prescriptions. Economics is too important to be left to
economists, law to lawyers, and politics to once and future kings.
Nor, thirdly, can the Macdonald Commission afford to assume that
once adopted, even coherent policies will be translated into operational
reality. Before leading a horse to water, one must have a horse - and
water. The situation of labour - precisely because the term «labour» is so
amorphous - illustrates the point. Suppose that the Commission were to
recommend the adoption of an industrial strategy, one of whose components was a fundamental «understanding», a social compact amongst
government, business and «labour», which promised the latter both a voice
in key decisions and a fair share of their consequences. (Such a recommendation is, I believe, both desirable and inevitable.) How would a willing
government go about implementing such a recommendation?
Who would government and business «understand» with? Who would
negotiate and sign the social compact on behalf of labour? the CLC or provincial labour federations? alone or together with rival, schismatic, and
non-affiliated unions? with what binding effect upon the organizations they
represent, and upon the locals of those organizations which, under our
system, hold bargaining rights and by tradition make autonomous,
democratic decisions on contract ratification and strikes? Similar concerns
would arise with regard to the ability of «business» to deliver a binding
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commitment on behalf of its members, compounded by the difficulty of encouraging inter-firm cooperation on the labour market while outlawing it
on the product market. And even government must lift the pen to sign a
social contract with either a provincial or federal hand, wield it with an arm
whose wrist was under the control of, say, the labour department, its elbow
of Finance, and its shoulder of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. all the
while harbouring the mental reservations which are the privilege of
sovereign legislatures.
Moreover, if «understanding» is to be institutionalized, if «labour» is
to have a place in the higher councils of the nation, and if that place brings
with it a degree of power to make political and social decisions with
economic consequences, there is likely to be a decline in the relative importance (already modest) of local collective bargaining. Such a shift in
labour's priorities and in the locus of authority within the ranks of labour
would diminish the ability of individual workers and their local unions to
participate directly in the processes of industrial government. It is essential
therefore that concurrent and compensatory measures be addressed in order
to improve both the accountability of central labour representatives to their
constituents, and the actual direct participation of those constituents in
shop-floor and firm-level decisions about matters which cannot sensibly be
resolved elsewhere. Such matters range from work rules to quality control,
from investment policies to plant amenities, from health and safety to skills
training.
And if these transformations of labour's role in the economy and of
«labour» itself are a realistic possibility, we may still have to pause for a
moment before entering this Nirvana of «understanding». We would have
to ask ourselves whether this incorporation of «labour» into the managerial
structures of the state and the plant might in fact leave workers with the
worst of both worlds. Should they forfeit the right of defining and persuing
their own interests, without gaining a firm assurance that those interests will
be fairly protected, and that their contribution to the general welfare will be
matched by the contributions of others?
In this brief recital of the «labour» issues confronting the Macdonald
Commission, we can recognize some familiar themes. Above all, it has
become clear that as with liberal democratic politics, federalism, or the
market system itself, the basic problem is how to reconcile a principled commitment to the autonomy of individual actors with the allure of «understanding», and the logic of planning, integration, and order. If autonomy is accepted as a «given», no strategy proposed by Macdonald is likely to succeed. If «understanding», planning, integration and order are the way to
improve Canada's economic performance and brighten her social prospects, these can only be achieved by structural and institutional changes
which reduce the autonomy of workers and unions, of businessmen and
bankers, of federal and provincial governments and their many emanations.
What the Commission must earnestly consider is whether the chicken of institutional change can precede the egg of a commitment to greater social
and economic planning or only follow it. In short, it must understand the
implications of «understanding».
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If we once concede that all <<Understandings» involving government,
labour and management are vulnerable to the impact of external events
which we cannot anticipate, control or effectively respond to, if we once
concede that the very project of enhanced «understanding» is haunted by
unresolved internal contradictions, what is the point of pursuing research in
industrial relations?
It is possible to answer that question from several different perspectives. As a scholar, I am tempted to ignore it altogether, on the ground that
research needs no such justification. It is enough for archeologists and
astronomers, for mathematicians and linguists, that their research reveals
what is not known and offers new ways of understanding what is known.
Why not also for those of us interested in industrial relations?

As someone also interested in the practical world of human affairs,
however, I confess that my answer as a scholar will not be universally acceptable. At a minimum, I can imagine that a politician here or a bureaucrat
there or a partisan labour or business official somewhere else might be very
impatient with research in industrial relations which seemed neither to promise nor to produce any practical benefit. I would have, indeed, to confess
that, with hindsight, the research undertaken by the Task Force might be
regarded in this light. After all, the Task Force probably generated more
research than could be found in all the journals, thesis abstracts and government studies written since MacKenzie King was a pup (my language is vernacular, not spiritualistic). Yet the ink was hardly dry, the honoraria hardly
spent, before the policy prescriptions based upon that research had become
anachronistic.
I have already suggested that the failure of research was, in part, an
unavoidable failure of foresight. To this extent, it can hardly be faulted.
However, I now wish to propose that there may be other difficulties with industrial relations research which sometimes diminish its capacity to help us
to «understand».
The first of these difficulties I have already signalled when I referred to
my own ambivalent perspective as both a scholar and a person involved in
practical affairs. While no doubt a healthy tension can, and should, exist
between theory and practice, I do point out that when both inhabit the same
human mind - mine, for example - there are special risks which must be
guarded against. Essentially, these involve the dominance of practise over
theory. What we experience in our daily lives, what we «know» by doing,
becomes the paradigm, the deep structure, within which research is conducted. We too easily accept as inevitable, almost as a decree of nature, the
continuation of present policies and institutions and values, imagining only
that they are capable of evolution or marginal decline. We too diffidently
question and too seldom reconceptualize the very essence of our industrial
relations system. Certainly the Woods Report and most of its supporting
studies - judged as research - suffer from a failure to reach beyond the
conventional wisdom.
A second difficulty, linked to the first, involves such mundane issues as
time and money. Many industrial relations researchers are in frequent demand to serve as policy advisers, administrators and fixers - arbitrators
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and mediators - in the world of labour and management. The rhythm of
their research is therefore often quickened or broken by some new assignment; it seldom has an opportunity to build slowly and to mature fully.
Moreover, much of the most ambitious and serious research in the field
is commissioned research. Quite naturally, the commissioning body determines the orientation, budgets, timing and principal personnel and most important, the very subject to be studied. Despite the best intentions of
research directors, the dominance of commissioned research in industrial
relations does skew research priorities. It means that the abilities of some of
our most able scholars are devoted at any given moment not to the problems
which they believe most urgent, because they open up new lines of intellectual development, but to the problems which someone else deems most
pressing from a public policy perspective.
Indeed, so pressing is the demand for public policy research from time
to time - during the Woods and Macdonald efforts, for example - that it
mobilizes many people into vast expeditionary forces of researchers whose
primary qualifications are neither knowledge, nor interest - but only
availability. Their presence further dilutes the quality of industrial relations
research.
The difficulty of focussing the attention of the best minds upon the
most fundamental problems over an appropriate period of concentration is
a not uncommon one; it certainly haunts other disciplines - including my
own. But industrial relations suffers from one special difficulty which is not
universally experienced. Industrial relations is, as I earlier suggested, the interdiscipline, par excellence. There is no social science of which I am aware
which cannot help us to «understand» industrial relations. Nor can we fail
to appreciate the possible contributions of humanistic, scientific and
technical studies. But genuine collaboration and cross-disciplinary research
are notoriously difficult. They will rarely achieve the highest standards
when those involved pursue such activities only fitfully and for short-run
ends.
Ironically, then, the disappointed hopes of the Woods Report for the
stimulation of research reflect the very circumstances under which research
was conducted by the Task Force. Those circumstances persist today, I
believe, and will haunt the work of Macdonald to promote «understanding».
What remains for me is to offer only a few brief observations in aid of
understanding the links between the two types of «understanding» I have
identified.
The empirically unverified assumption of our industrial relations
system is that if we create appropriate formal conditions, workers will exercise their right to organize, form unions and use sensibly their collective
strength as a countervailing force to that historically possessed by
employers; that employers in turn will come to internalize the statutorilyimposed values of a good faith relationship with their workers; and that all
of them and all of us will live happily ever after. The largely unresearched
reality is that none of these assumptions have been fully justified, and that
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collective bargaining as a system has yet to demonstrate its capacity to cope
with change or crisis.
The implicit premises of industrial relations research are likewise at
odds with reality. We assume that research can do things for us - interpret
the past, administer the present, transform the future - but the conditions
in which we often pursue research are poorly designed for such tasks, and
hardly evince respect for scholarship for its own sake.
I should like to propose that these two phenomena are indeed related.
So long as the interests of labour, management and government (and of
each of their constituent elements) are seen to diverge and conflict, no
amount of research will promote «understanding» amongst them. On the
contrary, research is at best a threatening enterprise whose «scientific»
revelations may embarrass or indict, at worst a sinister and cynical device
deliberately employed to belabour one's enemies. Given the socio-politicaleconomic context within which much research is conducted, one should
hardly wonder at the hostility exhibited by leading labour and management
spokesmen towards intellectuals and theoreticians, either practising their
own trade or pursuing some part-time role in policy-making, administration
or dispute resolution. Nor should we be surprised by government's
philandering attitude towards the research community, whose favour it
courts intermittently and for its own purposes, while exibiting often a certain lack of basic respect.
The consciousness, as well as the behaviour, of researchers is in part
determined by this context, and they have difficulty in pursuing their own
objectives according to their own lights. Much research is devoted to recording and evaluating the existing system; much scholarly energy is dissipated
in texts for practitioners and students and in practical, but ephemeral,
work. And finally, such fundamental intellectual work as is undertaken
tends to be treated trivially by its suspicious and partisan audience.
If this diagnosis has any merit, then I am afraid that «understanding»
in the scientific sense is not likely to improve until one of two things happen: either fundamental tensions are eased in the world of work, so that industrial relations research can be treated less opportunistically and with
greater respect, or research begins more clearly to define its own context
and integrity outside of the practical realm of Task Forces and Royal Commissions. Thus, I am afraid that industrial relations research, as we now
know it, has at best limited capacity to promote «understanding» amongst
the interested parties.

My reluctant conclusion is, therefore, that «understanding» and
«understanding», practise and research, politics and science, had best exist
at arm's length for a while, until each acquires the maturity to participate in
a more intimate and fulfilling relationship.

